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Chủ đề trong 'Thị trường chứng khoán' bởi 06070809, 12/09/2011.

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Chủ đề này đã có 3553 lượt đọc và 81 bài trả lời
  1. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    10:58 12Sep11

    GERMAN GOVT SPOKESMAN SAYS WE WANT TO STABILISE THE WHOLE EURO ZONE WITH ALL MEMBER STATES
    GERMAN GOVT SPOKESMAN SAYS IF GREECE DOES NOT FULFILL TROIKA CRITERIA THAN IT IS AUTOMATIC THAT NEXT TRANCHE CANNOT BE PAID

    CORRECTED GERMAN ECON MIN SPOKESMAN SAYS INSTRUMENTS FOR ORDERLY GREEK DEBT INSOLVENCY NOT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE (NOT 'NOT BEING READIED')

    GERMAN GOVT SPOKESMAN: GERMANY ASSUMES GREECE DOING ALL IT MUST TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS. ONLY TROIKA CAN JUDGE IF GREECE IS DOING ENOUGH. STRONG AGREEMENT BETWEEN MERKEL AND ECONOMY MINISTER OVER EURO ZONE CRISIS.

    ---

    Officials in Merkel’s government are debating how to shore
    up German banks in the event that Greece fails to meet the
    budget-cutting terms of its aid package and is unable to get a
    bailout-loan payment, three coalition officials said Sept. 9.
    The move capped a week of escalating German threats that Greece
    won’t get the money unless it meets fiscal targets, and as
    investors raised bets on a default..

    The aim of the contingency plan is to shield German banks
    from losses from a possible Greek default, which has a more-than
    90 percent chance of happening within five years, prices for
    insurance against default show.






  2. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    The fact that Greece did not default this weekend (as had been considered a possibility) is unlikely to provide even a short term fillip to markets that are focused on the broader issue of sovereigns and banks across the euro area.
    We believe markets will continue deteriorating until a concerted global response takes place. In this context, market participants will scrutinise any policy makers' statement to gauge the appetite for such response. Focus will be on the numerous high-level meetings scheduled for the week including on Monday, a meeting between Barroso and Merkel and the Eurogroup and EcoFin meetings in Poland starting on Friday and going into the weekend. A gathering of European policy makers. and private sector representatives will also gather at the Eurofi forum1 starting on Thursday with speakers including among others Weidman, Barnier and pdt Trichet. Euro area finance ministers will meet on Friday at 8:00 BST and will join the other EU ministers and central bankers at 11:30 BST in Wroclaw


  3. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    Phó thủ tướng, bộ trưởng Kinh Tế (Gốc Việt) Đức Rösler : "Chính phủ Đức đang cân nhắc đến kịch bản Hi Lạp phá sản".
    German government ponders Greek default scenario. Economics minister Rösler wrote in an op-ed for Welt newspaper that "all possibilities should be on the table in order to stabilise the euro" and "this includes an orderly default of Greece if the instruments are available". The finance minister, according to news reports, is at the same time discussing internally several scenarios in the event of a Greek default.
  4. hoadang22

    hoadang22 Thành viên gắn bó với f319.com

    Tham gia ngày:
    06/07/2009
    Đã được thích:
    51
    Ông bộ trưởng này bị mấy bố tay to Vịt ngan giật dây rồi=))=))=))=))=))=))=))
  5. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    End-game implications of a default: two types of discussions are dominating the scene, that of a Greek default (with or without exclusion from the euro zone) and that of a Euro bond. In our view, a Greek default is more likely than a Euro
    bond in the short term, but will not happen unless the IMF/ECB/EU decides to pull the plug, most likely in a scenario where Greece would be unlikely to satisfy its fiscal adjustment demand. Excluding Greece from the Euro zone would be a
    further step for which we think there is little ground for the moment.

    This would most likely be discussed when a Euro bond discussion takes place. Whether the IMF/EU/ECB is in a position to unplug support remains an open question, but is not a taboo question. The real question is the extent to which there would be contagion towards Euro countries that the Euro zone banking sector can resist. Our banking equity analysts reckoned under the EBA double dip scenario –which is a severe stress scenario-, and assuming a 50% loss in Portugal, Ireland and Greece (but nothing in Spain and Italy), the banks covered in their universe capital need would amount to about €100bn (to recap to an 8% Basel III core Tier 1 number; BofAML universe represents 50% to 2/3rds of the European universe looked at by the IMF.

    Using data disclosed with the EBA stress test, European banks hold roughly €650bn of peripheral sovereign debt in their banking and AFS books, which can be broken down as follows: Greece (€78 bn), Ireland (€14 bn),
    Portugal (€30 bn), Spain (€244 bn), Italy (€220 bn) and Belgium (€57 bn)).
    Euro bond discussion: this is a discussion really conditional on the appetite for Euro governments to surrender some national sovereignty in favour of Euro
    sovereignty. Although, based on our reading of the press, Germany seems open to these suggestions in the sense that there is a debate around it, it appears that France may be less open to these topics, and the debate (popular and
    Parliamentary) has been modest. In our view, only further pressure from the markets would trigger an open discussion of these subjects before the next couple of years (i.e. past the French and German national elections, due in May
    2012 and Sept. 2013 respectively).
    Intermediate solution: this has to do with finding a way of increasing the EFSF action capacity either without endangering the rating of the guaranteeing countries or ensuring that a possible downgrade would have little impact on the EFSF capacity of action. This would follow the Gros-Mayer proposal of turning the EFSF into some kind of credit institutions that could accede the liquidity window operations of the ECB, or would allow the EFSF to borrow and leverage on its current capital. In either case, we think the idea would be to find some way for the EFSF to have a large firepower based on the current euro zone government commitment structures. We think it is a possibility that the Eurogroup may find an alternative that sidesteps EFSF’s current legal status and capital structure to give it new firepower, but we think it is becoming more difficult to satisfy markets with these kinds of solution, so whether this will be enough to prevent the contagion to Italy from worsening remains to be seen
  6. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    Tổng nợ của PIIGS khoảng 3000 tỷ Euro, tương đương hơn 4000 tỷ USD, trong đó phần lớn là nợ tréo và nợ Đức, Pháp, Anh.
  7. KBTCV20

    KBTCV20 Thành viên gắn bó với f319.com

    Tham gia ngày:
    27/10/2007
    Đã được thích:
    327
    Cả thế giới quay cuồng tìm cách chống đỡ đại khủng hoảng kinh tế TG lần 2- Khủng hoảng nợ công bắt đầu từ Hy lạp. Các nước đều cho lập kịch bản đối phó.

    Riêng VN ta bình chân như vại ( nhưng cũng được TT giao nhiệm vụ lập kịch bản chống đỡ này).

    Lần này VN đi ngược cả TG hơi bị ngoạn mục các bác nhẩy. Thế mà chúng nó dám hạ định mức tín nhiệm của VN ta có láo không cơ chứ.[:D]
  8. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    3 banks lớn nhất của Pháp:
    SocGen giảm 10%, quay về mức giá của năm 1992. Mức giá khủng hoảng 2008 đã xuống qua.
    BNP Pariba giảm 13%.
    Credit Ag giảm 9%.

    Banks Đức, Ý...:
    Deutsche Bank giảm 9%.
    ING -8.6%
    Unicredit - ngân hàng lớn nhất Ý giảm 7.3%



  9. alwayrunfirst

    alwayrunfirst Thành viên quen thuộc

    Tham gia ngày:
    18/06/2011
    Đã được thích:
    0
    Đang hưng phấn, tin xấu là muỗi. Mai mốt thị trường quay đầu thì lại là tin bom tấn >:)>:)
  10. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    Phản ứng của banks Pháp:

    Following in BNP's footsteps, Soc Gen has decided to issue a detailed press release (titled "Accelerating the Transformation") in response to concerns about its short and long-term funding, and troubled asset exposure to GIIPS and legacy assets, and its solvency. We remain of the opinion that the short-term liquidity profile of the bank is very poor compared to peers and its solvency is relatively weak, in accordance with our recent report on the French and investment banks, attached
    This is where we have the greatest concern for the bank. Management states that it has successfully addressed the reduction in US$ funding acccess through a combination of:a) Acceleration of disposals of USD legacy assets,b) Increased use of secured USD funding (eg. Repos of EUR 6bn CMBS and CLOs with maturity longer than 6 months)c) EUR/USD swapsd) Reduction in short term market positions.This is a costly exercise in our opinion which, as BNP management has already noted, entails more expensive funding being used, resulting In a negative impact on margins.
    Most importantly, management does not state its short-term high quality liquid assets with respect to its short-term wholesale funding (i.e. the liquidity coverage ratio). This is a fairer measure of the robustness of Soc Gen's liquidity profile and in this respect, Soc Gen fares the worst out of all the French and investment banks (see page 4 of attached note). Soc Gen states that the group's buffer of unencumbered liquid assets is €105bn - however, this includes lower quality assets (such as risky sovereign bonds which can now only really be repo'd with the ECB, and AAA credit assets like RMBS, which we do not consider high quality and liquid). We think its true high quality liquid asset portfolio is more like €42bn by our calculations

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