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Chủ đề trong 'Thị trường chứng khoán' bởi 06070809, 12/09/2011.

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  1. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
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    US Economy Goes From Bad to Worse: Economist

    ​
    there is a risk of the US economy falling back into recession over the next few years.
    http://www.cnbc.com/id/44514905
    ​
  2. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

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  3. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

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  4. luckiemnam

    luckiemnam Thành viên gắn bó với f319.com

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    16/04/2010
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    khủng cái giề mà chốt phiên châu âu tăng điên loạn
  5. meochinmong

    meochinmong Thành viên gắn bó với f319.com

    Tham gia ngày:
    27/03/2010
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    Cho nó phá sản đê. Nhưng mà Hylap phá sản thì thèn Tàu Khựa nó qua nó cứu rồi nó thao túng càng chết nữa. Mịa nậu. Đến Italia mà còn cầu Tàu Khựa giải cứu kìa. Chuyến này thằng Tàu làm bá chủ thế giới mất thôi.
  6. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

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    11/08/2009
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  7. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

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    11/08/2009
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    What price, Greek default recoveries?

    Posted by Joseph Cotterill on Sep 14 17:03.
    Greece has been less a ‘when does it default?’ and more a ‘what’s the recovery on the debt?’ sovereign for a while now. At least round these parts.
    Obviously in the last few days it’s really become about the recoveries as brinkmanship/risks of official creditor defection spiralled.
    There are a few ways in which this has manifested, including the marked price advantage of Greek English-law bonds over the domestic-law bonds. (Though this depends. While English law will offer some protection on recovering assets, it’s been pointed out to us that Argentina’s post-default exchange treated its foreign-law creditors more or less the same as domestic holders. Most of the Argentine debt came under foreign law, the opposite scenario to Greece’s pre-swap debt stock, but it’s intriguing.)
    There is another price divergence between recoveries quoted in standard Greece CDS contracts and those in specialised recovery CDS, which allow counter-parties to trade the difference between actual recoveries and a fixed recovery price. Recovery swaps and lock quotes increasingly imply around 25 per cent recovery versus around 35 to 40 per cent in the normal CDS. So, some trading strategies on Greek recovery are using a clearly bearish (or “realistic” depending on your view) benchmark. There are a few reasons why this low recovery is plausible — for example Greece expends resources on rescuing banks and/or depositors during a default, which would otherwise go to bondholders, or it opts for a “clean slate” debt reduction to (say) 50 per cent of GDP.
    That’s one view of recoveries.
    Complicating matters in a fascinating way, though, there’s the Greek bond swap. Which it is proving easy to forget still exists. But it could still affect bond recovery estimates.
    Actually it has affected recovery prospects already by virtue of appearing to be dead on arrival, and it is interesting to piece out why.
    Gabriel Sterne of Exotix made this point very well in a note on Greek bonds published this week. He started from the general observation that the Greek bond swap paradoxically leaves the individual investor with considerable recovery, but overall is so ineffective at restoring solvency that everyone in aggregate risks much lower recovery eventually. (He adds that its failure to improve solvency also hobbles the credibility of Greece over its reform efforts. It renders most reforms pointless.)
    So, as Sterne says:
    As the offer fails to provide enough relief, the private sector’s search for value is as much about figuring out a strategy to take a bigger share of Greece’s available resources, as it is about judging what the available resources are. There is a hope that public sector collateral guarantees and subsidies will help bail out the private sector. The value in the offer lay not in sound fundamentals, but in the EFSF’s principal guarantees (with a PV of around 30) and the possibility that the official sector might then keep Greece afloat long enough for bondholders to get a return above the market price. But the likelihood of Greece paying back in full is, in our opinion, very small.
    ​
    In a previous note, Sterne argued that principal protection in some options of the bond swap, including the EFSF collateral, provided a floor to Greek bond prices. (Although naturally this means that the swap’s value markedly changes if the EFSF gets riskier as a credit. We’re assuming the EFSF is the only realistic provider of collateral here.) With the CDS market now exploring recoveries below 30, something’s gone very wrong – largely outside the purview of the swap, as official creditors appear to be on the verge of pulling the plug. (With no swap, and therefore Greece can’t pay off any holdouts either.)
    Paradoxically (again) however, Sterne argues that any holder of shorter-dated Greek bonds actually receives an extra incentive to tender into the bond swap because of this, as the market price on their holding collapses. It’s very much like a gamble for redemption, we think. Potentially very remunerative indeed, but still, a gamble.
    So to sum up, the bond swap remains a high-risk but (plausibly) high-recovery trade, but it is now surrounded by trading which increasingly assumes very low (and still falling) recoveries. It’s a fragmented and complicated scenario to be sure.
    Above all though, it’s not looking “orderly”.
  8. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

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    11/08/2009
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  9. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
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    FRENCH PRESIDENT SARKOZY TOLD CABINET FRANCE WILL DO EVERYTHING TO SAVE GREECE
    FRANCE REAFFIRMS NEED FOR RAPID ADOPTION OF JULY 21 ACCORDS ON GREEK BAILOUT, COMMITMENTS BY GREECE
    FRENCH GOVT SPOKESWOMAN SAYS THERE IS EVERY REASON TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN FRENCH BANKING SYSTEM



    Moody’s cut French bank debt on the 90 day anniversary of putting the
    securities under review:
    SocGen debt and deposit ratings cut from Aa2 to Aa3, negative outlook; Credit
    Agricole’s long term ratings downgraded from Aa1 to Aa2; BNP had its Aa2
    long-term rating maintained on review
    This outcome was expected given the 90 day review period expired and we
    have tended to see rating agency downgrades as backward looking with
    regard to both equity prices and the cost of funding: Soc Gen 5 year CDS spread 430bps, +286bps over three months; Agricole 5 year CDS spread
    317bps, +168bps over three months; BNP 5 year CDS spread 302bps; +188bps
    over three months.
    However, Moody’s sovereign assumptions are interesting and for Agricole are:
    60% haircut on Greek debt; 50% haircut on Irish & Portuguese debt; 10% on
    Spanish debt; 7% on Italian debt.


    Clearly these are interim results in the case of both Spain and Italy, because
    the chance of a marginal default on debt held to maturity is virtually zero;
    there will either be a big default or none at all. Thus, should the economic
    situation in core Europe deteriorate further, we should assume that Moody’s,
    at least, will be back with more downgrades.
    In response to these downgrades and high share price volatility the banks
    have taken some action and issued lots of heat and steam: Soc Gen proposed
    to free up EUR4bn of capital by 2013 and CEO Oudea said that the bank would
    survive a total freeze in US money market fund financing;


    Credit Agricole announced a formal support mechanism for its investment
    bank, by way of guarantee from the parent, will be in place by December.
    Note this is precisely what the ring fence is designed to prevent happening at
    UK banks.
    BNP pointed out it had ample US$ funding. Short term USD assets are
    EUR65bn and liabilities EUR60bn, of which US MMF supply EUR36bn, down
    EUR10bn since end July. FX swaps have bridged the gap and BNP has $30BN of
    collateral that may be pledged at the Fed window.
    No one should doubt the access of French banks to US$ funding, which will be
    provided either by the Fed or the ECB through its dollar swap programme


    However, investors may choose to question the viability of banks funded by
    central banks, as has been the case for Greek, Irish and other banks.
    As we argued yesterday, regulators have protected financial institutions, not
    just banks, from going bust, which has led to over capacity and depressed
    returns in the industry. Investors have responded by marking down equity
    prices and denying access to funding for businesses that are no longer
    profitable at the margin.
    SocGen and BNP have loans to assets around 36% and Agricole is 25%,
    although its relationship with its parent banks means a large portion of
    interbank assets may also be counted as commercial loans.





    We have seen slower growth, lower leverage and
    higher funding costs as key headwinds to French
    banks. But BNPP has been quick to react and adapt to
    this new environment. It plans to readjust its $ liquidity
    profile, reduce leverage and optimize RWAs. The
    update on funding and $ liquidity is also reassuring.
    We are OW BNPP, which remains, in our view, more
    solid than peers in a period of strong uncertainty,
    further highlighted by no rating action from Moody’s.

    Funding / liquidity: reassuring: BNPP published a
    useful update on its $ funding needs. Group exposure to
    US MM funds decreased by €10bn during the summer,
    but BNPP managed to offset this through the use of
    other tools (swaps, assets runoff). BNP’s ST $ assets
    stand at €65bn, which compares to ST $ funding of
    €60bn. This provides comfort on potential for a quick
    run-down. BNPP also managed to raise €3bn of term
    funding this summer via private placements (MS+83bps,
    6Y maturity) and still receive strong demand for these
    products. This means BNPP is one of the rare banks
    that started pre-funding for 2012. The lack of senior
    unsecured issuance remains a question mark, but it
    seems BNPP can cope with the situation for now

    Deleveraging will start: BNPP already identified its key
    targeted wholesale funded activities. These include ST
    $ lending activities (e.g. trade finance), but non-core
    leasing, specialized mortgages, real estate, shipping
    and aircraft are also targeted. Overall, BNP targets a
    decrease in $ liquidity by $60BN by 2012 and €12bn of
    non-core retail portfolios. Longer-term, BNPP should
    also benefit from accelerated disintermediation; given it
    has the World #1 Euro DCM platform.

    Capital: CIB optimization will accelerate. Group
    deleveraging should reduce RWAs by €70bn. Group
    now targets officially 9% CET 1 ratio by Dec-2012, in line
    with MSe. Further Greek impairments to be expected in
    case of failure of the Greek plan (15bps impact).




    As for the sovereign crisis, BNPP believes that a provision at current market
    valuation levels (55% haircut for Greece and 30% for Portugal and Ireland) would
    lead to a pre-tax loss of €1.7bn for Greece and impacts in terms of CET1 of 15bp
    (Greece) and 5bp (Portugal and Ireland). BNPP believes it largely possesses the
    earnings depth to absorb these shocks. However, the bank does not envisage a
    haircut for Italy (€20.7bn) vieiwing the macro situation (budgetary deficit, household
    debt and austerity measures) as manageable. We fully share the group’s stance: in
    our report dated 7 September (‘Cheap, but all those uncertainties!’) we estimated
    that a 70% haircut for Greece, 40% for Portugal and Ireland and 20% for Spain and
    Italy would hit the CT1 by 92bp while we put average CT1 generation capacity at
    130bp per year.


    The fall in the share price yesterday was halted by firm denial of rumours in the
    WSJ. The group has now presented its reactions to the crisis at a conference
    in New York: 1/ liquidity in euros is abundant and eligible assets amount to
    €135bn; 2/ short term financing in $ is under €60bn, of which €36bn from US
    monetary funds (€46bn at end July). BNPP uses forex swaps to offset this decline
    and intends to scale back its short term exposure in $ by $60BN (€44bn) by the end
    of 2012; finally 3/ M/LT financing for 2011 is entirely accomplished. The group
    estimates that its refinancing costs have risen by 60bp since February 2011. In
    2012, €24.4bn of M/LT debt matures. On our estimates, 200bp of extra funding cost
    would knock 3.7% off 2012 profits
  10. 06070809

    06070809 Thành viên tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
    11/08/2009
    Đã được thích:
    9
    Greece, cont...

    Greece's government held an emergency cabinet meeting Sunday to plan new measures to bring its unruly budget deficit into line, after heated warnings from the other euro-zone nations over the weekend that its efforts were insufficient and might threaten the delivery of future aid.

    During a late-evening break in the meeting, Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos pledged that Greece would adopt a raft of new budget-cutting measures endorsed by the "troika" ... Greece agreed in March this year to lay off 80,000 public-sector workers by 2015. But the government has also hired around 25,000 new workers in the past two years to fill shortages in select areas of the public sector.

    Now, with Greece unlikely to meet its deficit targets this year, the troika has upped the target for public-sector layoffs to 100,000 ...
    ​

    ​

    The Greeks face an October deadline to qualify for 8 billion euros, or $11 billion, in aid, without which Greece will certainly default on its growing debt.

    The payment is just one installment in a larger package of 110 billion euros in aid agreed to by euro zone members in spring 2010; a second bailout fund, for 109 billion euros, was agreed to in July, though that has yet to be ratified.

    To reach the financial targets, Greek leaders discussed a range of draconian layoffs and pay reductions ... While these measures have long been planned, but never carried out, to the frustration of foreign lenders, the discussion of these cuts represented a marked change in approach for the Greek government, with the emphasis on reductions over revenue increases.
    ​
    ​

    ​
    ​

    ......​
    ​

    ​
    ​

    The Greek 2 year yield declined to 55%. The Greek 1 year yield is at 110%. Both significantly off the highs.​
    ​
    ​


    ​

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